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Abstract
The relationship between firms’ owners and managers is a quintessential example of costly principal-
agent interaction. Optimal design of monetary incentives and supervision mechanisms are the two tradi-
tional ways of reducing agency costs in this relationship. In this paper, we show evidence which is consistent
with a third mechanism: firms have managers whose economic preferences are aligned with owners’ inter-
ests. We uncover differences in economic preferences between managers employed in firms controlled by two
distinct classes of ‘patrons’: employee-owned firms (worker cooperatives) and conventional investor-owned
firms. In a high-stakes lab-in-the-field experiment, we find that co-op managers are less risk-loving and
more altruistic than their conventional counterparts. We do not observe differences between the two groups
in terms of time preferences, reciprocity, and trust. Our findings are consistent with existing evidence on
worker cooperatives, such as their tendency to self-select into less risky industries and their compressed
compensation structures.
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1 Introduction
A long tradition in economics, management, and organization studies conceptualizes the re-
lationship between managers and firm owners using a principal-agent framework (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976). Two mechanisms usually receive the most attention in terms of addressing the
potential divergence of interests between owners and managers. On the one hand, owners may
introduce financial incentives, such as tying executives’ compensation to the long-term perfor-
mance of the company. On the other hand, owners may implement direct control mechanisms,
such as performing frequent audits and evaluations. In the last few decades, the standard agency
framework has been criticized for relying on a restrictive set of behavioural assumptions (Pepper
and Gore, 2015). Moreover, advances in experimental and behavioral economics have inspired
a potential third mechanism, which focuses on having managers with the ‘right’ preferences as
a way of reducing the wedge between owners and managers’ interests (Fehr et al., 1997; Akerlof
and Kranton, 2005; Besley and Ghatak, 2005; Ben-Ner, 2013).
If managerial preferences are relevant for aligning owners and managers’ incentives and
thus reducing agency costs, we should empirically observe firms controlled by different principals
having managers with different preferences. In this paper, we compare economic preferences
between managers employed in two sharply distinct organizational settings: employee-owned
firms (worker cooperatives) and conventional investor-owned firms. Worker cooperatives are
owned and democratically managed by their workers. This introduces a set of differences in
their objectives compared to conventional firms (Bonin et al., 1993). Two of these differences
are particularly relevant for the managerial preferences examined in this paper. First, worker-
owners’ relatively low wealth and excessive concentration of financial and labor risk in the firm
they own and work for make them less oriented to choose risky investment projects (Drèze,
1976; Hansmann, 1988; Bonin et al., 1993). Second, as in standard median-voter redistribution
models, coops have relatively more egalitarian earning structures (Kremer, 1997; Abramitzky,
2
2008; Burdín, 2016; Montero, 2020; Dow, 2018).
We conduct a lab-in-the-field experiment to gather incentive-compatible measures of risk
preferences, time preferences, and social preferences (altruism, reciprocity, and trust) from 196
Uruguayan managers. Half of these managers work in worker cooperatives and the other half
in conventional private-sector firms. The two subsamples of managers are balanced in terms
of demographic (age, gender, education) and firm-level characteristics (size and industry com-
position). In order to have a benchmark for managers’ preferences, we further implemented
the same experiment with a sample of 92 first-year undergraduate students. We conducted the
experiment in Uruguay using oTree, an open-source platform for implementing economic exper-
iments (Chen et al., 2016). The average payment in the experiment was two times higher than
the average hourly managerial wage in the Uruguayan private sector. We measured risk aversion
and impatience by using lottery choice and inter-temporal choice experiments based on multiple
price lists (Falk et al., 2016). To measure altruism, we relied on a standard Dictator Game. We
elicited trust and positive reciprocity as first and second-mover behaviour in the Trust Game
(Berg et al., 1995). To measure negative reciprocity, we used subjects’ minimum acceptable
offer in an Ultimatum Game (Güth et al., 1982). A crucial advantage of lab-in-the-field experi-
ments is that they are conducted in a naturalistic environment targeting a theoretically relevant
population without losing control of experimental conditions, combining the benefits of both
laboratory and field experiments (Gneezy et al., 2016).
We find that the fraction of risk-loving subjects among co-op managers is 10 percentage
points lower than among conventional managers. Moreover, co-op managers are more altruistic
than their conventional counterparts. Dictator game transfers are, on average, 6 percentage
points higher for co-op managers compared to their conventional counterparts. We also find
that co-op managers are significantly more (less) likely to implement the perfectly egalitarian
(selfish) allocation than conventional managers. Importantly, because these differences in pref-
erences could be correlated with other firm and manager characteristics differing between co-ops
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and for-profits, we report that preference differences are robust to controlling for a set of man-
agers’ characteristics (age, education, gender) and firms’ characteristics (size, industry). We do
not observe significant differences between the two groups in terms of time preferences, trust,
and reciprocity. Behavioral differences between co-op and conventional managers are broadly
consistent with the fact that the two types of managers report to principals (employee-owners
and investors, respectively) who have a different set of objectives and preferences (Ben-Ner et al.,
1993).
Our study contributes to the existing literature in two distinct ways. Firstly, our paper
adds to the literature on behavioral agency theory (Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 1998; Pepper
and Gore, 2015). We use incentivized lab-in-the-field experiments to uncover the prevalence
of nonstandard preferences among managers, providing a new reassessment of the behavioral
assumptions of the standard agency framework. By comparing managers employed in conven-
tional firms and worker cooperatives, we move beyond the traditional focus on family firms
(Neacsu et al., 2014).1 In a study similar to ours, Fehr and List (2004) compare the trusting
behaviour of CEOs and students and find that CEOs are significantly more trustful and display
more trustworthiness than students. Koudstaal et al. (2016) conduct a lab-in-the-field experi-
ment comparing entrepreneurs to managers and employees in terms of risk preferences. They
find that the three groups are not different in terms of risk aversion, but entrepreneurs are less
loss-averse than managers and employees. Opper et al. (2017) study risk preferences in a sam-
ple of CEOs of private manufacturing companies in China and document correlations between
elicited risk attitudes and corporate strategic choices and performance. Nee et al. (2018) elicit
trust among Chinese CEOs and uncover a relationship between CEO experience in relational
exchange and generalized trust. Finally, Holm et al. (2020) study the strategic behaviour of
CEOs of private firms in experimental games. They show that CEOs differ from other people
in strategic decision-making and beliefs about the strategy of others. We add to this literature
1We also speak to the experimental literature comparing students and non-standard subjects (Gneezy and
Imas, 2016; Fréchette, 2015, 2016; Batsaikhan and Putterman, 2019).
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by comparing a wide range of economic preferences across managers employed in two sharply
different organizational settings. Our findings are consistent with well-known facts about the
behaviour of worker cooperatives in market economies, such as their tendency to select into less
risky and less capital-intensive industries and their more egalitarian compensation structures
(Dow, 2018). Hence, our paper also relates to behavioral strategy research, which highlights
the connection between managers’ behavioral preferences and firm-level strategic choices and
outcomes (Powell et al., 2011).
Secondly, we contribute to the study of worker cooperatives, employee ownership, and alter-
native enterprise forms. Despite their prominent economic role in modern economies (Hansmann,
2012), these alternative organizational forms have received far less attention than conventional
profit maximizing firms in organization studies(Gibbons and Roberts, 2015).2 Importantly, the
behaviour of managers has been largely overlooked in the previous theoretical and empirical
literature on worker cooperatives.3 As pointed out by Atkinson (1973), this omission may be
due to the long-standing practice of assuming that worker cooperatives coherently pursue a
single objective of maximizing income per worker. This assumption rules out the problem of
separation of ownership and control arising in any large (conventional or cooperative) firm op-
erating under the control of appointed managers, rendering the issue of managerial behaviour
of only secondary analytical importance. Ben-Ner and Ellman (2013) argue that the long-run
success of worker cooperatives may depend on their ability to attract and retain the appropriate
mix of behavioral types. They highlight the role of social preferences and personality traits in
mitigating shop-floor work incentives problems, but do not address the issue of selection into
top management positions. Few papers provide evidence on individuals’ prosociality in coopera-
tives. Ruffle and Sosis (2006) find that kibbutz members and non-members exhibit similar levels
2According to Arando et al. (2012), worker-managed firms account for 13% of economic activity in the northern
Italian province of Emilia Romagna and 8% of industrial gross value added (and 4% of overall gross value) in
the Basque Country, Spain, where the Mondragon Cooperative Corporation is located. In 2016, employment in
non-profit organizations represented 10% of total US private sector employment (Ghatak, 2020).
3The study of managers’ preferences acquires special relevance given the evidence on the effect of managers’
behavioral traits in shaping firm behaviour and, hence, productivity (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Bloom and
Van Reenen, 2007; Kocher et al., 2013; Mullins and Schoar, 2016; Bandiera et al., 2020).
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of cooperation when faced with anonymous outsiders. Gneezy et al. (2016) conduct economic
experiments in two Brazilian fisherman societies that differ in their workplace organization and
find that fishermen cooperate and trust more when fishing is organized in teams rather than as
an individual activity. Hopfensitz and Miquel-Florensa (2017) find that cooperative farmers in
Costa Rica do not contribute more than private market farmers to a common fund. A set of
recent theoretical papers have analyzed the importance of attracting socially motivated man-
agers for non-profit organizations and social enterprises (Besley and Ghatak, 2005, 2017). To
our knowledge, our paper is one of the first attempts to use economic experiments to assess the
behavioral pattern of selection of managers into worker cooperatives.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the conceptual framework and
hypotheses. Section 3 explains the experimental design. Section 4 presents our five main findings
on managers’ risk preferences, impatience, altruism, negative reciprocity, and trusting behaviour.
Section 5 concludes and discusses limitations and future research.
2 Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses
Controllers or principals are those members of the organization who collectively have the ultimate
right to make decisions and delegate authority to managers or other agents (Hansmann, 1988;
Bolton and Dewatripont, 2012). Principals obtain their positions through the ownership of firms
(Ben-Ner et al., 1993). Principals are constrained by the extent to which managers are willing
to cooperate and advance principals’ goals. Managers may behave opportunistically and not
follow owners’ objectives (Jensen and Meckling, 1979).
Firms can be classified according to the identity of the ultimate control group. Usually,
the control group is made of persons or entities (‘patrons’) who share a common transactional
relationship with the firm, either as buyers of the goods produced by the firm or as suppliers
of production inputs (Hansmann, 1988). In conventional investor-owned firms, control rights
belong to capital suppliers. By contrast, in worker cooperatives the decisive authority collec-
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tively rests on the workforce. Given differences in the identity of their patrons, we expect to
observe differences in economic preferences between managers employed in these two types of
organizations. More importantly, we expect those differences to follow a pattern that is consis-
tent with the reduction of agency costs. Next, we discuss which preferences may better align
managers’ decisions with owners’ interests in different areas of the administration of the firm.
We draw our hypotheses from existing theoretical and empirical studies on worker cooperatives.4
Risk preferences. A long-standing explanation of the paucity of worker cooperatives in
market economies rests on the idea that worker-owners may face a higher cost of risk bearing
than investors. Members of a worker cooperative would be less able to cope with risk as their
financial wealth and human capital are tied up in the same company (Meade, 1972; Drèze, 1976;
Bonin et al., 1993). The preference for holding a diversified financial portfolio would be even
more important when workers have firm-specific human capital (Dow, 2018). Hence, risk-averse
worker-owners would prefer to invest in relatively more conservative projects and rely on ex-
ternal funding.5 Podivinsky and Stewart (2007) and Belloc (2017) show, in fact, that worker
cooperatives tend to avoid risky environments, i.e. they are less likely to enter industries in
which the variance in profits is high. Moreover, there is extensive evidence showing that worker
cooperatives absorb negative economic shocks through changes in income rather than layoffs
(Craig and Pencavel, 1992; Pencavel et al., 2006; Burdín and Dean, 2009).6 This suggests that
worker cooperatives attract members with a strong preference for job security (Dow, 2018).
When workers (instead of investors) act as principals in the owner-manager relationship, they
4Here we focus on theoretical arguments that may explain differences in managerial preferences between
cooperatives and conventional firms. The importance of attracting specific behavioral traits for cooperatives,
such as time and social preferences, has been discussed in other contexts. For instance, altruism and reciprocity
may induce less shirking and sustain peer pressure and mutual monitoring in cooperative teams. Moreover, low
discount rates may uphold conditional cooperation in repeated interactions via tit-for-tat strategies and allow to
overcome free-riding problems in team production. Self-selection and retention of members endowed with these
behavioral traits may help to sustain high levels of shop-floor effort provision and labor discipline in cooperatives
(Putterman, 2006; Carpenter et al., 2009; Ben-Ner and Ellman, 2013).
5Compulsory profit plow-back rules also play an important role in helping worker cooperatives to accumulate
capital in many countries (Pérotin, 2013).
6One could also argue that worker-owners may be willing to tolerate greater earnings risk in exchange for
greater job security.
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may select managers that are relatively less willing to take risks.
Hypothesis 1. Co-op managers are less willing to take risks than managers employed in
conventional firms.
Time preferences. Members of worker cooperatives make critical intertemporal choices
regarding how to distribute the surplus between current and future consumption, i.e. between
members’ compensation in the current period and investment. A well-known argument states
that worker cooperatives may suffer from the so-called ‘horizon problem’ (Furubotn, 1976; Jensen
and Meckling, 1979).7 If the assets of the cooperative are collectively owned, members have no
claim on the return of investments after separation from their firm. While the entrepreneur
in a conventional business can fully pocket the investment proceeds, cooperative members can
only enjoy investment returns while remaining in the firm. Hence, members’ willingness to rein-
vest in the cooperative depends on how long they expect to stay in the firm and the expected
return of the investment compared to workers’ opportunity cost of the funds. If the expected
employment period of members is shorter than the productive life of potential assets, this would
imply that the rate of time preference (or discount rate) used in the evaluation of investment
projects will be higher in cooperatives than in conventional firms.8 Indeed, compulsory profit
plow-back rules force worker cooperatives in many countries to accumulate a share of profits into
asset locks (Navarra, 2016; Pérotin, 2013). In our context, these rules could be interpreted as a
commitment device aimed at helping worker-members to avoid self-destructing inter-temporal
choices. Overall, we expect cooperative members would generally select and instruct managers
to implement projects yielding smaller-sooner returns rather than larger-later returns.
7The horizon problem should not arise if workers are allowed to buy and sell membership rights in an open
market. This is because any investment will be reflected in the value of individual shares. However, membership
markets are generally rare and play a very limited role in the Uruguayan context.
8One could also expect members of worker cooperatives to discount the future more heavily than owners of
conventional firms if workers in general in the economy face higher interest rate on borrowing compared to capital
owners (Askildsen and Ireland, 1993).
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Hypothesis 2. Co-op managers are more impatient than managers employed in conven-
tional firms.
Social preferences. Social preferences have received increasing attention in organization
studies (Camerer and Malmendier, 2007; Ben-Ner, 2013; Ben-Ner and Ellman, 2013). The term
refers to individuals’ concern for the payoffs allocated to other individuals and the intentions
that led to such payoffs (Camerer and Fehr, 2004: Carpenter, 2008). This definition includes
altruism, reciprocity, and trusting behaviour, among other prosocial behaviours.9
Several management decisions entail within-firm distributional consequences with hetero-
geneous effects on different segments of the workforce. These decisions cover a wide range of
managerial actions, from the definition of compensation schemes to the setting of rules regarding
work conditions and required effort levels. Similarly to median-voter models of redistribution in
democratic societies, cooperatives are democratic organizations and, as such, they tend to imple-
ment more egalitarian compensation schemes and working conditions (Kremer, 1997). Members
may then want to recruit relatively more equality-oriented managers, so they are more likely to
implement more egalitarian decisions.
A consequence of cooperatives’ egalitarian policies that reinforces their preference for more
equality-oriented managers relates to the brain-drain risks faced by this type of egalitarian
organizations (Abramitzky, 2011; Burdín, 2016). Given that managers themselves will usually
be the highest-paid worker in the coop, they may be less likely to leave if they derive utility
from themselves having a less advantageous position in the firm’s earnings distribution. The
lower managerial pay in cooperatives compared to conventional firms may also help to screen
in more altruistic managers. Therefore, we expect altruistic preferences to be more important
9Sen (1966) is an early attempt to incorporate the role of social preferences (“sympathy”) in a theoretical
model of cooperative production. Rose-Ackerman (1996) discusses the role of altruistic preferences in the context
of non-profit organizations.
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among co-op managers compared to their conventional peers.10
In principle, we do not expect to observe differences between co-op and conventional man-
agers in terms of other types of social preferences, such as reciprocity and trust. First, worker co-
operatives are characterised by a dual-governance structure. On the one hand, workers-principals
appoint managers, set objectives, and control how firm policies are implemented. On the other
hand, managers act as quasi-principals organizing and monitoring the actions of the workers.
However, while workers have the power to dismiss managers, managers cannot replace workers
without a collective decision from the cooperative membership (Ben-Ner et al., 1993). Over-
all, cooperatives offer little room for managers to reciprocate workers’ actions, positively or
negatively, by targeting rewards or imposing sanctions. Second, Ben-Ner and Ellman (2013)
highlight the role of trust in sustaining conditional cooperation in cooperatives. However, they
also flag the risk of negative selection with opportunistic types seeking to join cooperatives to
take advantage of trusting members.11
Hypothesis 3. Co-op managers are more altruistic than managers employed in conven-
tional firms.
3 Experimental design and procedures
3.1 Practical procedures
We collect experimental measures of risk, time, and social preferences. To do this, the standard
procedure is to conduct incentivized experiments in a university computer laboratory using stu-
10See Ghatak (2020) for a related discussion on the selection of socially motivated managers in social sector
organizations. Anecdotal evidence from Mondragon cooperatives in the Basque Country also supports the idea
that the internal wage structure is more compressed in worker cooperatives than in conventional firms, with the
usual ratio of top-bottom not exceeding 5:1 and top managers receiving roughly 30% lower earnings than in the
conventional sector (Arando et al., 2015).
11Despite the main focus of the study being the behavioral traits of managers in two distinct organizational
settings, we also collect similar measures from a sample of students (see Fréchette (2015) for a discussion of
methodological issues faced by researchers when comparing professionals and students in experiments). In line
with previous studies, we expect students to behave in less pro-social ways than adults in experiments (Falk et al.,
2013; Belot et al., 2015). Closely related to our study, Fehr and List (2004) find that CEOs are significantly more
trustful and display more trustworthiness than students, achieving higher efficiency in their interactions.
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dent subjects. Given the unconventional nature of our subject pool (managers), their relatively
high opportunity cost of time (e.g. relevant for commuting to the laboratory site), and the
complex logistics related to organising conventional laboratory sessions, we decided to imple-
ment an online experiment. Online experiments have grown exponentially in the last decades,
particularly since the development of online labor markets such as Mturk. Horton et al. (2011)
show that online experiments can quantitatively reproduce behaviour from the physical labora-
tory. Eckel and Wilson (2006) discuss potential threats to the validity of online experiments.
In the context of the present study, the use of online experiments is a pragmatic solution to the
problem of recruiting subjects with a relatively high opportunity cost of time.
We implemented our online experiment using Otree (Chen et al., 2016). Otree is an open-
source software platform that allows running experiments remotely. Otree use provides a highly
flexible solution as managers can participate in the experiment from their own locations at any
time by relying on a wide range of devices (desktop computers, tablets, phones). In total, 288
subjects participated in our study. This included 96 cooperative managers, 100 conventional
managers, and 92 students. Managers correspond to the highest-ranked worker in firms’ hier-
archical structure. Thus, each manager in the experiment corresponds to a single firm. The
sample of managers comes from a firm-level survey conducted by members of the research team
in 2011 (Alves et al., 2012). Cooperatives in this survey were representative of the universe
of Uruguay cooperatives. Conventional firms participating in the survey were representative of
conventional firms in economic sectors with presence of worker cooperatives.
The 96 cooperatives with managers participating in our experiment account for 22% of the
population of Uruguayan worker cooperatives registered in 2016. Managers in cooperatives are
appointed by worker-members and take care of the daily operation of the company, consulting
members when it comes to making strategic decisions (e.g. investments). Uruguayan worker
cooperatives usually fill managerial positions by relying on members rather than on hired labor.
Participation in the experiment was voluntary and subjects were free to quit the experiment
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at any time. A few manager subjects started the experiment but did not complete all of the
experiment’s phases or did not provide their bank account information to receive the payment.
We do not consider these subjects in any of the paper’s results. In the invitation letter distributed
among participants, we explained the purpose of the study in very general terms (“the objective
of this research project is to analyse human behaviour in various situations”). This should
mitigate concerns about potential experimenter effects, as participants had no clue about the
details of the study.
We recruited students by e-mail through the student list of a first-year undergraduate
course at the Business and Economics School of National University of Uruguay (Universidad
de la República). An initial e-mail invitation was sent out asking for those interested in partici-
pating in the study. Responders were then contacted via e-mail providing them with information
about the procedure to participate online, potential earnings, and rules of payment. Managers
were contacted by phone and then received an e-mail invitation with information about the
experiment’s general procedure and expected earnings. After accepting to participate in the
experiment, subjects received an e-mail with a unique URL to the experiment. These URLs
contained a random code so even if participants communicated with one another, the link would
not allow them to identify other players. This is particularly important for the Ultimatum and
Trust games, which involve sequential strategic interactions. The same experimental protocol
was applied to all subjects. Payoffs earned in the incentivized experiments were paid out to
subjects by bank transfer in the same week they completed the experiment, except for the time
discounting experiment that involved payments after three and six months. Online sessions
lasted about 40 minutes and the average payoff was 1,027 Uruguayan pesos (34 US dollars at
the time), including a show-up fee of 480 Uruguayan pesos. The stake is 2 times higher than
the average hourly managerial wage in the Uruguayan private sector as reported in the official
household survey. We conducted the experiment in 2018. The experiments with students ex-
tended over a couple of weeks between February and March and the experiments with managers
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took place between May and November.
In Table 1, we report descriptive statistics on observable characteristics for the three
groups of subjects. The table shows that the subsamples of co-op and conventional managers
are balanced in terms of demographic (age, gender, education) and firm-level characteristics
(size and industry composition). Students are obviously younger than managers on average.
3.2 Description of experiments
We rely on standard incentivized tasks and experimental games designed to elicit risk preferences,
impatience, altruism, trust, and positive and negative reciprocity. The experiments’ design
follows Falk et al. (2016) closely. Monetary stakes were presented in points (100 points =
21 Uruguayan pesos 0.7 US dollars). All experimental games involving strategic interactions
were one-shot games in order to avoid repeated game effects. Subjects were told that they
were interacting with another (anonymous) participant remotely located and that they were not
going to play with the same partner more than once. We did not make participants’ identities,
i.e. managers employed in cooperatives and conventional firms, salient in any particular way.
Participants then knew that they were interacting with human subjects but did not know about
any characteristics of those subjects. In the Dictator, Ultimatum, and Trust games (see below),
each subject played the game twice, once in each role. As our focus is on between-subject
comparisons, choice experiments were presented in the same order to all subjects.12
Risk preferences. We elicited risk preferences by using a multiple price list (MPL) in which
subjects choose between a lottery and varying safe options (Holt and Laury, 2002; Dohmen et al.,
2017; Charness et al., 2013). We presented participants a list of 21 decisions between two options:
a safe one (option A) and a risky one with known probabilities (option B). In each row, option B
corresponded to earning 1000 points with a 50% chance or zero points with a 50% chance. The
safe option A, on the other hand, gradually increased from zero (row 1) to 1,000 points (row
12For a discussion of order effects, see Charness et al. (2013).
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21). After a participant made a decision for each row, we randomly determined which row was
relevant for the participant’s payoff. Depending on the subject’s choice in that row, her payoff
would be either the safe option or the outcome of the lottery. This procedure guarantees that
each decision is incentive-compatible (Dohmen et al., 2017). Our measure of risk is the value
of the safe option at the switching row, i.e. the row in which subjects switch from preferring
the lottery to the safe payment.13 Following Holt and Laury (2002), as long as subjects have
monotonic preferences, they will prefer the lottery up to a certain level of the safe option, and
then switch to preferring the safe option in all subsequent rows of the price list. The value of
the safe option at the switching point is usually interpreted as subjects’ certainty equivalent.
The higher the value of the safe option, the greater is the individual’s willingness to take risks.
Risk-averse subjects should prefer safe options that are smaller than or equal to 500 points (the
expected value of the lottery) over the lottery. Only risk-loving subjects should prefer the lottery
when the offered safe payment is greater than 500 points.
Time discounting. We elicited time preferences by using a multiple price list, in which
subjects choose between a payment today (400 points) and a larger delayed payment in 3 months.
The early payment was always 400 points and the delayed payment increased by 10 points in
each subsequent row, starting from 430 points in the first row and reaching 660 points in the
24th row. The first-row value implied an inflation-discounted annual return rate of around 24%
and the value in the 24th row reached an annual return rate of around 600%. Our experimental
measure of impatience is the value of the delayed payment (the implied rate of return) that is
necessary to induce the subject to wait 3 months, i.e. the row in which the subject switches
from the early payment to the delayed payment.14 Similar to the procedure used in the domain
of risk, after participants made a decision in each row, we randomly determined which row was
13The fraction of subjects exhibiting multiple switching points was 17.7%, 15%, and 16.3% in cooperative
managers, conventional managers, and students, respectively. We compute the average switching point in those
cases.
14The fraction of subjects exhibiting multiple switching points was very similar across groups (8-9%). We
compute the average switching point for these cases. The fraction of subjects having nonunique switch points is
similar to previous studies using multiple price lists (Holt and Laury, 2002).
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relevant for the participant’s payoff. To reinforce subjects’ credibility about the experiment and
its associated payment, we attached a letter signed by the School’s Dean. We also implemented a
second multiple price list in which we introduced front-end delay (shift horizon design): subjects
choose between an early payment in 3 months and a larger payment in 6 months. The within-
subject comparison between the front-end delay and no front-end delay choice sets conveys
information on the extent of present bias or dynamic inconsistency among subjects (Frederick
et al., 2002).
Altruism. We measured altruism by the share of the endowment (300 points) transferred
by dictators in a standard Dictator Game. In this game, the Dictator decides how to split the
endowment between herself and another player, the Recipient (Kahneman et al., 1986; Forsythe
et al., 1994). The standard prediction assuming self-regarding dictators is that subjects would
share nothing with the Recipient and keep the whole endowment for themselves.
Trust. We elicited trust as the first mover’s behaviour in the Trust Game (Berg et al., 1995).
More precisely, we measure trust as the amount sent by the first mover (“trustor”) in this game.
In our trust game, a Trustor and Trustee each receive an initial endowment of 250 points. The
Trustor can invest all or part of her money by sending any amount y ∈ {0, 50, 100, 150, 200, 250}
to the Trustee. The experimenter then triples the amount sent, so that the Trustee receives
3y. The Trustee then decides to return any amount z between 0 and 3y + 250 to the Trustor.
As a result of these decisions, the Trustor and Trustee’s final payoffs are 250 − y + z and
250 + 3y − z, respectively. The standard prediction is that self-regarding trustees will return
z = 0. Anticipating that, a self-regarding trustor should transfer nothing (y = 0).
Reciprocity. Following Fehr and Gächter (2000), a preference for reciprocity is the desire
to punish others seen as harming one (negative reciprocity) and the desire to benefit others seen
as benefiting one (positive reciprocity). We measured negative reciprocity with the minimum
acceptable offer (MAO) in the Ultimatum Game (Güth et al., 1982). In the Ultimatum Game,
a Proposer makes an offer y regarding the division of an initial endowment (500 points) between
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herself and a Responder. The Responder can either accept or reject the offer. In the latter case
(y < MAO), both players earn zero. If the Responder accepts the offer (y ≥ MAO), she earns
y and the Proposer earns 500 − y. The higher the MAO, the more subjects are willing to forgo
their monetary gain in order to punish unfair offers. The standard prediction for this game is
that self-regarding responders will accept any positive offer and that Proposers will offer the
smallest possible positive amount. Finally, we elicit positive reciprocity as the second mover
behaviour in the Trust game and measure it as the amount sent back in that game. We relied
on the strategy method, which implies that participants make conditional decisions for the same
discrete set of predetermined offers.15
4 Results
This section presents our main findings. We are interested in understanding whether managers
employed in cooperatives exhibit different economic preferences than managers employed in con-
ventional enterprises. For each preference domain, we compare the two subsamples of managers.
We also report the results for the student pool in order to have a conventional subject pool as
a benchmark.
RESULT 1. The share of risk-loving subjects is significantly lower among co-op managers
than among managers employed in conventional firms.
We measure risk attitudes by looking at the value of the safe option at the switching row
for each individual, i.e. the point in which the individual switches from the lottery to the safe
payment. The higher a subject’s certainty equivalent, the greater her willingness to take risk.
15The use of the strategy method is also common in experiments embedded in representative surveys given the
logistical problems of implementing sequential games in a one-step procedure (Fehr et al., 2003). According to
Brandts and Charness (2011), the strategy method produces qualitatively similar results when compared to the
standard direct-response method. However, they find that the levels of punishment are lower with the strategy
method.
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In Figure 1 (panel a), we plot the mean safe option for each of the three groups. The
difference between co-op and conventional managers is not significant according to a Mann-
Whitney test (p-value= 0.3168).16 The associated median coefficient of relative risk aversion
(CRRA) lies within the interval 0.13-0.24 for cooperative managers and 0-0.13 for conventional
managers and students.17
As shown in Figure 1 (panel b), the proportions of risk-neutral, risk-loving, and risk-averse
subjects differ between co-op and conventional managers. Subjects are risk-neutral if they prefer
the safe option to a lottery with the same expected value (i.e. 500 points) but choose the lottery
for smaller values of the safe option; or if they play the lottery when the safe option is 500
points but do not play the lottery when the safe option is greater than the lottery’s expected
value. Subjects are risk-loving (risk-averse) if they prefer (not) to play the lottery when the
safe option is larger (smaller) than the lottery’s expected value. The share of risk-neutral and
risk-averse subjects is not statistically different across groups at conventional values but there is
a significant difference of around 10 percentage points between cooperative managers and both
conventional managers and students in the share of risk-loving subjects.
To investigate this difference further, we estimate a series of Probit models in which the
dependent variable equals one if the subject is risk loving and zero otherwise, and the indepen-
dent variable of interest is a co-op dummy. We further control for gender, age, and education.
Results reported in Table A.1 in the Appendix reinforce the conclusion of risk-loving subjects
being more common among the sample of conventional managers. The status of co-op manager
is associated with a significant reduction of 10 percentage points in the probability of being a
risk-loving subject, even after controlling for managers’ characteristics (gender, age, education)
and firms’ size and industry (column 3).18
16We exclude subjects who never switched between the lottery and the safe payment. This share was 14%,
13%, and 2% for cooperative managers, conventional managers, and students, respectively.
17We provide details on this calculation in the Online Supplementary Appendix OA.4.
18We ran additional regressions with controls for time of the day (morning, afternoon, evening) and day
of the week at which the subjects completed the experiment (see Table OA.3.1 in the Online Supplementary
Appendix). The basic results remain unchanged. We also estimated the regression model excluding subjects who
switched multiple times between the lottery and the safe payment(see Table OA.3.2 in the Online Supplementary
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RESULT 2. There are no differences in the average degree of impatience between co-op
and conventional managers. The share of dynamically inconsistent subjects is also similar across
groups.
In the inter-temporal choice experiments, subjects made choices between a fixed immediate
payment (400 points) and a (larger) payment to be received in 3 months. As explained in section
3, subjects also made inter-temporal choices across a 3-6 months’ time horizon. As described
above, the delayed payment becomes increasingly attractive as we increased its value from 430
points in row 1 to 660 points in row 24. Our experimental measure of impatience is the value
of the delayed payment at the row in which subjects switch from the immediate to the delayed
payment. The higher the value of the delayed payment required to postpone an immediate
reward, the more impatient the subject is.
In Figure 2 (panel a), we display the mean delayed payment for the three groups in the no
front-end delay (0-3 months). The difference between co-op and conventional managers is not
significant according to a Mann-Whitney test (p-value= 0.7557). Regression analysis further
confirms that there are no differences between the two types of managers (Tables OA.3.3 to
OA.3.6 in Online Supplementary Appendix). Figure 2 does not include subjects who were
always impatient or always patient. Figure A.4 in the Appendix shows the fraction of always-
impatient (Panel A) and always-patient (Panel B) subjects by group under both the no front-end
delay (left) and front-end delay condition (right). About 18% of co-op managers and 15% of
conventional managers behave in that way in the no front-end delay condition. The conclusions
do not change if we impute extreme values of the delayed payment to these subjects.19
We exploit the within-subject comparison of intertemporal choices made under the two
Appendix). Despite a substantial reduction in the number of observations (25-30%), the co-op dummy remains
negative, but estimates are rather imprecise.
19We apply the following rule to impute extreme values to non-switchers. For non-switchers who are always
impatient, we assigned them what would be the following value after the highest postponed value in the list (i.e.
670 points). See Figure A.5 in the Appendix.
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time frames to assess the extent of dynamic inconsistent behaviour among cooperative managers.
More precisely, we compute the fraction of subjects who were more, less, or equally patient in
the 0-3 months than in the 3-6 months’ horizon. We classify subjects as present-biased if they
behave more impatiently (i.e. greater delayed payment at switching row) in 0-3 months than in
3-6 months. In other words, present-biased individuals are more impatient in the present than in
the future. On the contrary, future-biased subjects behave more impatiently in the 3-6 months
than in the 0-3 months choice set. Finally, constant discounters are those who were equally
patient in both choice sets. We report the composition of the three groups in Figure 2 (panel
b). Approximately half of the cooperative managers made choices consistent with constant
discounting. The share of present-biased subjects is similar across groups, ranging from 20% to
27%. None of the differences is statistically significant according to Fisher’s exact tests.
In Figure 3, we plot the fraction of patient subjects at each decision row for each group in
both intertemporal choice sets (0-3 months and 3-6 months). This reinforces the idea that coop-
erative managers’ time discounting behaviour is similar to the other two groups. As expected,
the fraction of subjects choosing to wait increases with the amount of the delayed payment
for all groups and in both choice sets. This is reassuring considering that subjects’ revealed
time preferences in the 0-3 months’ choice may be confounded with risk aversion and credibility
concerns. Individuals may attach greater risk to delayed compensation than to the immediate
payment. In the 3-6 months’ choice, as both payments are dated in the future, we are holding
constant any perceived risk attached to future payments (Bettinger and Slonim, 2007).
RESULT 3. Co-op managers appear to be more altruistic than their conventional coun-
terparts, according to their behaviour in the Dictator Game. The share of subjects implementing
the perfectly egalitarian (selfish) allocation is higher (lower) among cooperative managers.
Our measure of altruism is the fraction of the endowment transferred to the other subject
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in a standard Dictator Game. Figure 4 reports the mean give rate by group. On average, co-op
managers transferred 44% of the initial endowment. This compares to a mean give rate of 38%
and 31% among conventional managers and students, respectively. Differences in generosity
between co-op and conventional managers are statistically significant (Mann-Whitney test: p-
value= 0.0382). Students are the least generous group in our experiment, even though their
average contribution is in line with previous studies.20
In Table A.2 in the Appendix, we report Tobit model estimates in which we regress the
give rate on a coop dummy and controls for managers’ age, gender, education, firm size, and
industry dummies. Estimates of the coefficient associated with the co-op dummy are consistently
positive with a magnitude around seven percentage points, but imprecisely estimated.
In Figure 5, we report the distribution of give rates by group. For managers, in line with
previous studies, we find a bimodal distribution with one main mode at giving nothing and the
other one at splitting the endowment equally. On the one hand, about 56% of co-op managers
split the endowment equally. This compares to 37% and 27% of conventional managers and
students, respectively. On the other hand, the fraction of co-op managers whose behaviour con-
forms to the standard prediction based on selfish players is 5%. This share rises to 18% and 22%
for conventional managers and students, respectively. Regression analysis reported in Table A.3
in the Appendix further confirms these differences. The fraction of cooperative managers imple-
menting the egalitarian allocation is 21 p.p. higher compared to conventional managers, after
controlling for individual and firm-level characteristics (column 3). Consistently, the fraction of
purely selfish players is 13 p.p. lower among cooperative managers (column 6).
RESULT 4. There are no differences in the share of the endowment offered in the Ultima-
tum Game. Moreover, the comparison of minimum acceptable offers does not reveal significant
20For instance, the average give rate in the meta-analysis conducted by Engel (2011) is 28.3%. Based on two
large samples of Amazon Mechanical Turk workers, Brañas-Garza et al. (2018) report an average give rate of
27-31%.
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differences in terms of negative reciprocity.
In Figure 6, we report the mean offer (panel a) and the minimum acceptable offer (panel b)
for each group. The observed range of average offers is in line with previous studies (Oosterbeek
et al., 2004) and we find no significant differences in the behaviour of subjects playing as pro-
posers. Co-op managers offered on average 44% of the endowment, while offers by conventional
managers and students were 46% and 42%, respectively.21.
The comparison of the Dictator and Ultimatum Game reveals some suggestive patterns.
The strategic nature of the UG implies that subjects with different degrees of altruism may
exhibit similar choices. For example, in the canonical Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model of inequity
aversion, under moderate degrees of other-regarding preferences UG proposals do not depend on
proposers’ degree of inequity aversion but only on their expectations about receivers’ preferences.
In our context, this might explain why coop and conventional managers exhibit similar proposer
behaviour in the UG game although DG results show that co-op managers are more altruistic.
In relative terms, co-op managers transferred the same amount in the two games. By contrast,
the behaviour of the other two groups (conventional managers and students) reacted sharply to
the new strategic incentives embedded in the Ultimatum Game, rising their transfers by 8-11
p.p. compared to the Dictator game.
In Figure A.7 in the Appendix, we report the cumulative distribution function of the
fraction offered in the DG and UG. The distributions for conventional managers and students
exhibit the usual pattern. The dictator game’s cumulative distribution is consistent with DG
offers being less generous than UG offers. Precisely, the only group for which we cannot reject
the equality of the two distributions is the group of co-op managers (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test:
p-value=0.139). Acting in the role of proposers and given the veto power that responders have in
this game, conventional managers and students’ behaviour partly reflects the strategic concern
21Regression analysis reported further confirms that there are no differences between the two types of managers
in the Ultimatum Game (see Tables OA.3.7 and OA.3.8 in Online Supplementary Appendix).
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of avoiding a rejection.
Turning to responders’ behaviour, we rely on the minimum acceptable offer (MAO) in the
UG as a measure of negative reciprocity, i.e. a subject’s willingness to punish unfair proposers at
a material cost to herself. In Figure 6 (panel b), we report the average MAO by group. Acting
as responders, co-op managers’ MAO is approximately 40% of the endowment. Conventional
managers are willing to accept slightly lower offers. However, the difference between the two
groups is not statistically significant. The resulting average rejection rate was roughly 25% and
similar across groups.
RESULT 5. Subjects’ behaviour in the Trust Game reveals that trust and trustworthiness
are not significantly different between co-op and conventional managers.
Trust can be defined as a subject’s deliberate willingness to make herself vulnerable to the
actions of another party (Rousseau et al., 1998; Kocher et al., 2013). In the context of the trust
game, the trustor’s trust is the willingness to transfer a positive amount to the other player with
the expectation that the other person will reciprocate at her own cost. The amount returned by
the trustee is commonly interpreted as a proxy for this subject’s trustworthiness. While trusting
behaviour allows implementing Pareto-superior allocations, it is risky for the trustor because a
selfish trustee has an incentive to keep everything. Hence, trusting trustors are vulnerable to
exploitation.
Figure 7 reports information on trustors (panel a) and trustees’ behaviour (panel b), re-
spectively. On average, managers transferred 60% of the endowment.22 There are no differences
between co-op and conventional managers. Interestingly, students trust significantly less than
managers in our experiment. This is consistent with previous evidence comparing CEOs and
students and with the fact that trust increases with age (Fehr and List, 2004). This may be
22Johnson and Mislin (2011) report an average transfer of 50% in their meta-analysis of 162 replications of the
trust game. On average, trustees return 37% of the amount available to return.
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explained by managers’ greater reliance on relational exchange in markets compared to students
(Nee et al., 2018).
The behaviour of trustees suggests a similar pattern. We elicit trustees’ choices using
the strategy method. Panel b of Figure 7 reports the amount returned by trustees for each
possible value of trustors’ transfers.23 On average, trustees return 34.7% of the total amount
available to return. We do not observe differences in subjects’ trustworthiness between co-op
and conventional managers. This is confirmed when controlling for their socioeconomic charac-
teristics (age, gender, education), for firms’ characteristics, and for managers’ risk attitudes.24.
The amount returned by trustees increases with the amount transferred by trustors. There
is also some indication that managers exhibit greater trustworthiness than students. Results
from Mann-Whitney tests indicate that these differences between both groups of managers and
students become significant for trustors’ transfers of at least 150 points.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
Co-op and conventional managers are accountable to different principals: worker-members and
investors. In this article, we compare the economic preferences of the two types of managers
using incentive-compatible measures of risk preferences, time preferences, reciprocity, altruism,
and trust gathered in the context of a lab-in-the-field experiment. Our analysis supports two
main conclusions. First, the fraction of risk-loving subjects is lower among co-op managers
compared to conventional managers. Second, co-op managers appear to be more altruistic than
their conventional counterparts. We do not observe significant differences between the two
groups across other preference domains, such as impatience, trust, and reciprocity.
As managers’ preferences mediate important strategic decisions within firms, our results
have important implications for understanding the behaviour of cooperatives in competitive
23We exclude trustees’ responses involving a rate of return of more than one. Across the five values of x, this
implies excluding an average of 21 subjects of each group.
24See Tables OA.3.9 and OA.3.10 in the Online Supplementary Appendix.
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markets. Observed differences between co-op and conventional managers in terms of risk pref-
erences and altruism seem consistent with well-documented facts about the actual behaviour of
cooperative firms, such as their concentration in less risky and less capital-intensive industries
(Podivinsky and Stewart, 2007) and their egalitarian compensation policies (Abramitzky, 2011;
Burdín, 2016; Montero, 2020). Our findings indicate that the different identity of principals
in worker cooperatives and conventional firms induces different patterns of behavioral selection
among managers. The observed pattern is consistent with the alignment of preferences of man-
agers and worker-principals, which in turn may contribute to reducing agency costs in worker
cooperatives.25
Our results suggest that less risk-prone and more altruistic individuals tend to self-select
into cooperative management positions. One limitation of our research design, however, is that
we cannot distinguish between selection and endogenous preference formation channels. Ob-
served behavioral differences between individuals in worker cooperatives and conventional firms
could also be due to the fact that firm ownership shapes individual preferences. The idea that
preferences are malleable and may change because of contextual factors or the long-term expo-
sure to certain institutions is now widely accepted (Bowles, 1998; Fehr and Hoff, 2011). Exper-
imental studies have shown that democratic institutions affect cooperative behaviour (Dal Bó
et al., 2010) and organizational decision processes affect ethical behaviour towards outsiders
(Ellman and Pezanis-Christou, 2010). Carpenter and Seki (2011) provide field experimental
evidence from Japanese fishermen supporting the idea that social preferences are endogenous to
the adoption of a cooperative institution. Ben-Ner and Ellman (2013) specifically discuss the
potential effects of organizational design on employees’ preferences.26
25Our results do not rule out the possibility that worker cooperatives specifically design the compensation
package in order to attract certain types of managers. For instance, egalitarian pay policies implemented by
cooperatives may help to screen altruistic and intrinsically motivated managers.
26Although our experiment does not allow us to separate the sorting and endogenous preference formation
channels cleanly, we provide suggestive evidence of the effect of cooperative experience on economic preferences
by exploiting variation in managers’ tenure. If the preference formation channel is important, one should observe
some type of correlation between managers’ preferences and tenure. This exercise should be interpreted with
caution, as managers’ tenure is obviously endogenous. In Appendix Table A.4, we explore the existence of
differences between cooperative and conventional managers in terms of risk preferences and give rate in the
24
Moreover, more research is needed to understand whether differences in economic pref-
erences between co-op and conventional managers correlate with industry characteristics and
translate into different management practices, organizational design, and performance.
dictator game, adding controls for managers’ tenure and an interaction between tenure and the co-op dummy. We
do not find significant correlations between managerial tenure and our measures of risk and altruistic preferences.
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Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Risk preferences















































Cooperative managers Conventional managers Students















Cooperative Managers Conventional Managers Students
Risk−averse Risk−lovers Neutral
Notes: In panel (a), the figure displays the average value of the safe payment at the switching row by group. Mann-Whitney
test Coop vs. Conventional (Student): p-value 0.3168 (0.1169). N: Coop Managers=83, Conventional Managers=88,
Students=90. In panel (b), the figure displays the distribution of risk preferences in terms of risk loving, risk averse and
risk neutral subjects. Fisher´s exact test (risk lovers) Coops vs Conv: p-value=0.051. N: Coop Managers=96, Conv
Managers=99, Students=92.
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Figure 2: Time preferences
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Cooperative Managers Conventional Managers Students
Future−biased Constant discounters Present−biased
Notes: In panel (a), the figure displays the average delayed payment at the switching row by group (0-3 months). Mann-
Whitney test Coop vs. Conv (Student): p-value 0.7557 (0.2162). N: Coop Managers=79, Conventional Managers=85,
Students=81. In panel (b), the figure displays the distribution of subjects’ types in terms of constant discounters, future-
biased and present-biased subjects. Fisher exact test (Constant discounters) Coop vs Conv: p-value=0.3390. N: Coop
Managers=87, Conventional Managers=90, Students=79.
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Figure 3: Fraction of patient subjects by group
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Notes: This figure displays the fraction of subjects that chose the larger-later payment for each value of the later payment.
Panel (a): no front-end delay condition (0-3 months). Panel (b): front-end delay condition (3-6 months)
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Coop managers Conventional managers Students
Notes: This figure displays the fraction of Dictators’ endowment transferred to Recipients (give rate) by group. Mann-
Whitney test Coop vs. Conventional (Student): p-value 0.0382 (0.000). N: Coop Managers=96, Conventional Man-
agers=100, Students=92.
35











0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Give rate (%)











0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Give rate (%)
Students
Notes: This figure displays the distribution of give rates by group. N: Coop Managers=96, Conventional Managers=100,
Students=92
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Figure 6: Ultimatum Game
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Coop managers Conventional managers Students
Notes: In panel (a), the figure displays the mean offer made Proposers in the Ultimatum Game. Panel a: Mann-Whitney
test Coop vs. Conv (Student): p-value 0.3020 (0.0291). In panel (b), the figure displays the minimum acceptable offer
elicited from Respondents. Panel b: Mann-Whitney test Coop vs. Conv (Student): p-value 0.1931 (0.0181). Both panels:
N: Coop Managers=96, Conventional Managers=100, Students=92.
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Figure 7: Trust Game
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Notes: In panel (a), the figure displays the mean Trustors’ transfer by group. Mann-Whitney test Coop vs. Conventional
(Student): p-value 0.6070 (0.0074). N: Coop Managers=96, Conventional Managers=100, Students=92. In panel (b), the
figure displays Trustees’ back-transfers elicited for each possible Trustors’ transfer value using the strategy method.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Cooperative Conventional Students P-value of mean tests
managers managers (1)vs(2) (1-2)vs(3)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
% Female 0.51 0.40 0.62 0.12 0.01
(0.50) (0.49) (0.49)
Average Age 45.65 47.23 22.92 0.33 0.00
(10.98) (11.55) (6.47)
% Incomplete secondary school 0.19 0.13 0.00 0.27 0.00
(0.39) (0.34) (0.00)
% Complete secondary school 0.14 0.16 0.04 0.63 0.01
(0.34) (0.37) (0.21)
% Incomplete tertiary educ/univ 0.21 0.26 0.91 0.40 0.00
(0.41) (0.44) (0.28)
% Complete tertiary educ/univ 0.47 0.45 0.04 0.79 0.00
(0.50) (0.50) (0.21)
% Small firms 0.73 0.65 0.23
(0.45) (0.48)
% Medium firms 0.24 0.21 0.62
(0.43) (0.41)
% Large firms 0.03 0.14 0.01
(0.17) (0.35)
% Industry 0.21 0.22 0.84
(0.41) (0.42)
% Services 0.68 0.62 0.41
(0.47) (0.49)
% Transport 0.09 0.12 0.56
(0.29) (0.33)
% Others 0.02 0.04 0.44
(0.14) (0.20)
Number of observations 96 100 92
Notes: Firm size categories defined as follows: Small firms (less than 20 employees), Medium firms (20-99 employees), Large
firms (100+ employees). Standard deviation in parenthesis. In column (4), we report the difference in means test between
co-op and conventional managers. In column (5), we compare managers and students.
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